Knowledge Argument

"Mary is a brilliant scientist who is, for whatever reason, forced to investigate the world from a black and white room via a black and white television monitor. She specializes in the neurophysiology of vision and acquires...all the physical information there is to obtain about what goes on when we see ripe tomatoes, or the sky, and use terms like ‘red’, ‘blue’, and so on...What will happen when Mary is released from her black and white room or is given a color television monitor?...It seems just obvious that she will learn something about the world and our visual experience of it. But then is it inescapable that her previous knowledge was incomplete. But she had all the physical information. Ergo there is more to have than that, and Physicalism is false."

The Knowledge Argument

Mary knows all the physical facts concerning human color vision.
Mary doesn't know all the facts concerning human color vision.

So there are facts about human color vision which aren't physical facts.

It seems like we're again inferring metaphysical conclusions from epistemic premises. Are we doing this in a legitimate way? We can try to resist the argument in the way we did for Descartes' arguments, by claiming that the following is invalid:

The fact that p is something A knows.
The fact that q is something A doesn't know.
The fact that p is not the same fact as the fact that q.

We might try to show this is invalid by claiming (e.g.) that the following argument has a false conclusion.

The fact that Clark Kent is in the room is something Lois knows.
The fact that Superman is in the room is something Lois doesn't know.
The fact that Clark Kent is in the room is not the same fact as the fact that Superman is in the room.

But is it really obvious that the conclusion here is false? It's clear that Clark Kent is Superman. But is it just as clear that the fact that Clark Kent is in the room is the same fact as the fact that Superman is in the room?

Also, even if this parity of reasoning argument has some force, there's something suspicious about the resulting physicalist view. The physicalist told us there is nothing in the world but physical things. But if that's right, why isn't knowledge of all the physical things sufficient to know everything in every way? Why are there more things to learn, or at least more ways of learning them?
Recap

How many kinds of substance are there?

Two
(Substance) Dualism

Arguments Pro:
(a) Argument from Doubt
(b) Argument from Introspection
(c) General arg's from Leibniz' Law

General Problem: How do the mental and physical interface?

Two-way causation:
Interactionism

Problem: Implausible given Causal Closure?

Physical causes mental, not vice versa
Epiphenomenalism

Problem: Makes mental states irrelevant (e.g. we never express them)

Minds = Brains
Identity Theory

Wait: Types or Tokens?

Mental-state types = Brain-state types
Type Identity Theory

Problem: Too few minds?
(cf. Multiple Realizability Arg)

Mental-state tokens = Brain-state tokens
Token Identity Theory

Problem: Not helpfully explanatory
on its own

One (and it's physical)
Physicalism/Materialism

Arguments Pro:
(a) Argument from Simplicity
   (Application of Occam's Razor)
(b) Argument from Explanatory Power

General Problem: How to account for minds as physical things?

Mental States = Functional States
Functionalism

Problem: Too many minds?
(e.g. "Einstein's Brain")