Decision Theory and Deontic Modality

Course Description

We'll explore two topics whose interrelations have recently become an area of intense investigation. The first topic is how agents ought to make decisions, given what they believe and what they value—the central question of decision theory. The second topic concerns the meaning of deontic modals (e.g. "ought", "should") used to talk about how agents should behave—a tough issue in semantic theory. Standard accounts of deontic modality have traditionally not made use of the apparatus and results of decision theory. However, arguments have recently surfaced suggesting that the meaning of deontic modals can't be understood apart from the resources of decision theory. Whether this is so or not is, at present, an open question. After a primer on decision theory, and surveying relevant recent literature on deontic modality, we'll be reflecting together on how much, if any, of the technical machinery used in decision theory is required in order to understand deontic modals.

Syllabus

• Syllabus

Required Readings

• Foundations of Causal Decision Theory (selections), Joyce
• Foundations of Causal Decision Theory (more selections! (6.1-6.2)), Joyce
• Choices Ch.2, Resnik
• "Causal Decision Theory", Lewis
• "Some Counterexamples to Causal Decision Theory", Egan
• "No Regrets; Or: Edith Piaf Revamps Decision Theory", Arntzenius
• "Self-Reinforcing and Self-Frustrating Decisions" (preprint), Hare and Hedden
• "Risk and Tradeoffs", Buchak
• "Risk, Rationality, and Expected Utility Theory" (preprint), Pettigrew
• "What "Must" and "Can" Must and Can Mean", Kratzer
• "The Notional Category of Modality", Kratzer
• "The Notional Category of Modality" (updated), Kratzer
• "Ifs and Oughts", Kolodny and MacFarlane
• "What We Know and What to Do", Charlow
• "Deliberative Modality Under Epistemic Uncertainty", Cariani et al.
• "Deontic Modals Without Decision Theory", Carr
• "The Best We Can (Expect to) Get? Challenges to the Classic Semantics for Deontic Modals", von Fintel
• "Bayesian Expressivism", Yalcin
• "Decision Theory: Yes! Truth-Conditions: No!", Charlow
• "How (Not) to Think About The Meaning of Ought", Charlow
• "Non-Factualism About Epistemic Modality, Yalcin
• "Reasons as Modals", Marushak
• "Deontic Modals and Probabilities: One Theory to Rule Them All?", Cariani
• "The If p, Ought p Problem", Carr

Background/Optional Readings

• "Decision Theory", Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Steele
• "Basic Measurement Theory", Suppes and Zinnes
• The Logic of Decision, Jeffrey
• "Counterfactuals and Two Kinds of Expected Utility", Gibbard and Harper
• "Decision Instability", Weirich
• "Subjective Probability and Expected Utility without Additivity", Schmeidler
• Risk and Rationality, Buchak
• "Revisiting Risk and Rationality: A Reply to Pettigrew and Briggs" (preprint), Buchak
• "Ought, Agents, and Action", Schroeder
• "Epistemic Modals", Yalcin